What an app can reach, and what it cannot. Precisely.

The statements

  • An app runs as a WebAssembly component and imports exactly the interfaces its world declares; an undeclared import fails to instantiate.
  • An app has no ambient authority: no filesystem, network, clock or environment except through declared access.
  • Credentials for outbound calls are held by the platform and injected into the call; an app never holds a key. Boundary: an upstream service can still reflect what it received; scrubbing is defence in depth, not a guarantee.
  • Outbound access is to declared hosts only, at a declared rate.
  • Secrets are envelope-encrypted at rest, per workspace.
  • Every release is signed, and the platform verifies it before running it.
  • Inbound webhooks are authenticated and replay-protected.
  • Every run is time- and memory-bounded.
  • Each workspace runs as its own deployment with its own database, and every app in it has its own database role. Boundary: the platform's operators hold one administrative credential that can reach every workspace's database; per-workspace credentials are planned, not built.

Execution records show what ran, with what input, and what came of it. They do not prove a model's reasoning, and they are not a compliance certification. We hold no SOC 2 or HIPAA attestation today.